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Abstract 
Fixing the exchange rate stabilises inflation and reduces monetary seignoriage, a key source of 
financing under the fiscal dominance hypothesis. However, the link between fixed exchange rate 
regimes and fiscal discipline in emerging markets has been found to be weak. This paper 
thoroughly reviews the issue through three venues. First, an alternative measure to gauge fiscal 
discipline –the so called shadow balance, inclusive of seignoriage revenues is proposed, since 
the traditional one, the primary balance, does not convey monetary financing; notwithstanding 
this modification, no robust relation is found either. Second, we sustain and then prove the 
hypothesis that fixing the exchange rate may have offsetting effects on fiscal discipline through 
the relaxation of the fiscal constraint of the government. In particular fixing the exchange rate is 
expected to reduce the cost and burden of debt and to enhance the ability to obtain revenues 
through a higher level of activity. The empirical test of this hypothesis follows a two-stage 
approach. First, we test the impact of the fiscal constraints on discipline: as advocated, a higher 
fiscal burden induces higher discipline; higher activity does not clearly relax discipline, although 
expenditures grow and the burden of debt is shown to diminish. The second stage tests the 
impact of fixed regime on the considered determinants. Again, the relation between fixed regimes 
and the reduction of the burden is robust, but not so the impact of fixed regimes on the cycle. 
Third, we explore the dynamics related to the pegging of the exchange rate, uncovering that at its 
inception exchange rates trigger an expansion and reduce the debt burden. This final outcome 
does not only strengthen our hypothesis but illustrates how the peg sows the seeds of its own 
destruction, also at the fiscal level. 
71. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, a strong emphasis on the causes of the traditional high inflation in 
emerging countries, and in particular in Latin America, has been placed on the fiscal 
dominance hypothesis. In emerging market economies, the argument goes as follows: 
the ability to obtain revenues through the fiscal system is weak; as a consequence, 
traditionally the financing of the deficits has been partially done through money creation 
by the Central Bank (seignoriage revenues), which in turn leads to higher inflation. 
The harmful effects of this practice on price stability and long-term growth 
contribute to explain that the quest for macroeconomic stability has typically had in the 
choice of the exchange rate regimes one of its central elements. Many countries based 
their programs of economic stabilization on regimes of rigid or semi-rigid exchange 
rates. The rationale for this strategy is clear: fixing credibly the exchange rate allows to 
tie down inflation expectations; this induces a more disciplined behavior in economic 
agents, and in particular, on the fiscal sphere, since a fall in inflation should drastically 
reduce seignoriage revenues, promoting fiscal discipline. 
Nevertheless, extensive empirical evidence has challenged this theoretical prior. 
In figure 1 we observe that fixed exchange rate regimes do not to improve primary 
balances, which has been the most used proxy for fiscal discipline, even if inflation and
therefore monetary seignoriage are substantially reduced1. It can be argued, as we do, 
that observed primary balances fail to capture the effect of pegs on fiscal discipline, 
since they miss the impact of seignoriage. However, when this problem is addressed by 
defining a shadow balance which account for the  effect of seignoriage on the fiscal 
balance –see Annex 1 the outcome is also unclear as displayed in the last column for 
each regime. 
Why do fixed exchange rates seem to fail in disciplining fiscal policy?. Bits of 
such theory have been forwarded by several authors, particularly for the case of Latin 
America. Most relevant is the contribution by Tornell and Velasco (1998), who show that 
                                               
1 These data refer to emerging market economies in Latin America and East Europe. Details 
on the sample are given in the annex. 
8fixing the exchange rate provides a free lunch in the short run in terms of inflation 
stabilization and reduces the incentives for fiscal discipline, relative to other stabilization 
programs based on flexible exchange rates. In other context, Gavin and Perotti (1997) 
and Gavin et al. (1997) have emphasised the relevance of borrowing costs on the 
behavior of fiscal authorities, which may also be related to the existing exchange rate 
regime. Finally, an extense literature, recently surveyed by Calvo and Vegh (1998), has 
analysed the expansionary impact of fixing the exchange rate: exchange-rate-based 
stabilization schemes usually bring about rapid disinflation (due to the anchoring of 
external prices), an economic expansion and a fall in real interest rates, which tend to 
reduce deficits, but these expansions are followed by recessions (boom and bust 
cycles). 
Taking into account these disperse contributions, this paper attempts to articulate 
a comprehensive hypothesis to explain the failure of fixed exchange rates to reduce 
fiscal imbalances and to test it empirically. The hypothesis revolves around the idea that 
even if the pegs impose monetary constraints to finance the deficits, other offsetting 
effects relax both the revenue-raising and financial constraints for the government. The 
first of these effects is related to the cycle and, in particular to the ‘boom and bust’ 
consequences derived from exchange rate stabilization. The second is through more 
favorable financing conditions after an exchange rate peg is implemented. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section two, the links between the 
fiscal constraint of the government and fiscal discipline are explained, and the concept 
of shadow balance introduced. In section 3, we setup our hypothesis, which is 
developed empirically, after some econometric consideration (section 4)  in a two-stage 
approach in section 5. Finally, the hypothesis is made more robust by considering the 
dynamics triggered by pegging the exchange rate on the economy in section 6. The final 
section draws some conclusions. 
92. FISCAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL DISCIPLINE 
The government budget constraint exposes the identity between the fiscal 
financing needs and sources, expressed in real terms and as a ratio of GDP:
dfbdgrpb {{ )(      (1)
The observed fiscal balance (fb) consists of the primary balance (pb) minus the 
interest payments on the stock of debt in the hands of the private sector (d), whose 
magnitude depends on the difference between the real interest rate (r) and the rate of 
growth (g). Fiscal balance is financed by increases in the stock of debt. Solving for the 
primary balance we derive the fiscal constraint of the government: 
> @ pbgdrdd {      (2)
 Note that seignoriage revenues (denoted by m) are not included in this 
expression, but in fact the observed primary balance already conveys seignoriage 
revenues, which accrue to the public accounts during the fiscal year, although they are 
not directly observable. Indeed, with no seignoriage the registered balance would have 
been lower. Furthermore this consideration is particularly relevant when the focus is to 
investigate the impact of the exchange rate pegs on fiscal discipline, as they constrain 
monetary policy and seignoriage. Therefore, we propose a modification to the above 
expression to take into account ‘ex post’ the seignoriage revenues, by substracting them 
from the primary balance. We denote such concept as shadow balance: sb = pb-m.
Clearly, this measure has some problems since does not strictly correspond to the fiscal 
balance that would have been registered if no seignoriage would have been possible, 
since it can be correctly argued the observed primary balance is to a large extent 
endogenous to the ability to raise seignoriage. However, this caveat is not possible to 
circumvent since it is a counterfactual. Modifying identity (1)  we obtain an equivalent 
fiscal constraint with the shadow balance: 
> @ sbgdrddm {     (3) 
In spite of the mentioned problem, the shadow balance is our alternative gauge for fiscal 
discipline, and written in this manner, expression (3) not only illustrates the sources of 
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financing fiscal disequilibria but also, when it is read from left to right, the determinants 
of fiscal discipline: a reduction in the right hand side implies a constraint to the public 
finances and is due to induce higher fiscal discipline, and vice versa. 
The first element is monetary financing through seignoriage revenues (m).
Indeed, revenues from seignoriage have typically been considered a special and 
heterodox form of taxation to finance deficits. Sargent and Wallace (1981) even 
suggested that inflation is a fiscal, rather than a monetary phenomenon because 
monetary policy is dominated by the financing needs of the government (the fiscal 
dominance hypothesis). Here lies the gist of the argument to link fixed exchange rate 
pegs with fiscal discipline: since pegs limit monetary autonomy they will reduce 
seignoriage, forcing to larger fiscal discipline. 
The impact on fiscal discipline of the financing is captured by the second 
term ( rdd  ). The increase in debt net of interest payments can be interpreted as the 
ability and scope to attract funds, both in the domestic and external markets, to cover 
the financing needs of the government. Financing constraints are determined by two 
intertwined aspects: the increase in indebtedness, ( d ), and the cost and burden of 
debt (rd). An increase in the former reflects, under this view wider access and a 
relaxation of the financing constraint; on the contrary increases in the cost and burden of 
debt hardens the constraint. 
The third term underscores the impact of growth, (g), and the cycle on fiscal 
discipline, suggesting that higher growth relaxes fiscal discipline. In expression (2) is at 
work the fact that higher rates of growth reduce the ratio of debt to GDP facilitating 
financing of the deficit, but this factor should be interpreted more loosely. Indeed, in 
expansions revenues are expected to increase and the fiscal constraints for the 
government would be relaxed2.
                                               
2 In emerging countries, expenditures are not expected to depend so much on the cycle 
because the main cyclical item in expenditures in developed countries, unemployment benefits 
are not generalized in emerging countries. However, other indirect channels as higher support to 
firms or consumers in cyclical downturns could be possible. 
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3. THE HYPOTHESIS 
The relevance of seignoriage and of the fiscal dominance hypothesis in the 
literature explains the emphasis on the first factor in the attempts to explain fiscal 
discipline in emerging countries. From here, it follows that fixing the exchange rate 
should guarantee higher fiscal discipline: under a fixed regime the monetary creation 
process is constrained, and therefore monetary seignoriage is reduced and fiscal 
discipline enhanced. 
However, in a previous paper [Alberola and Molina (2001)] we showed that, 
although the first hypothesis holds, the second does not3; that is, primary deficits are not 
significantly reduced when monetary seignoriage shrinks. The lack of a disciplining 
effect coincides with other evidence provided by Gavin and Perotti (1997), Tornell and 
Velasco (1998) or Calvo and Vegh (1999) which also used the primary deficit as 
measure of fiscal discipline. 
A first possibility for this result is to argue that primary deficits do not properly 
convey fiscal discipline and in particular the impact of pegs therein, hence our 
alternative definition of shadow balance. 
Yet, provided the alternative gauge of fiscal discipline does not solve the 
problem, we should be ready to provide a hypothesis to explain the result. We argue in 
what follows that, fixed exchange rates regimes relax both the revenue-raising and the 
financing constraint of the authorities and that this more than compensates its potential 
disciplinary effects through reduction of seignoriage. The following chart outlines our 
hypothesis, which is developed in a two-stage approach. 
                                               
3 In that paper, the proposed explanation was that even under a fixed regime financing the 
deficit through the central bank is feasible, at least in the short run. Indeed, we showed that fiscal 
seignoriage (measured as the transfers of money from the central bank to the government) is not 
constrained by fixing the exchange rate and, more importantly, that the primary deficit is 
negatively and significantly correlated with fiscal seignoriage, endorsing the idea that fiscal 
discipline is enhanced when fiscal seignoriage is reduced. 
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The first stage focuses on the actual effectiveness of the cyclical and financial 
constraints on fiscal discipline. The propositions to test in this first stage are: 
I) A favourable cyclical position, mostly by increasing revenues, relaxes fiscal 
discipline. A strong version of this hypothesis would imply a negative 
relationship between the cycle and fiscal discipline, but this is perhaps a too 
strong assumption. Rather, what it is to be expected is an increase in primary 
expenditures, induced by higher revenues. Note that this is contrary to 
conventional wisdom, whereby expenditures should tend to be countercyclical, 
due to the operation of automatic stabilizers as unemployment benefits. These 
stabilizers are all but absent in emerging countries. 
II) Reduced costs of borrowing and lower burden of debt relax fiscal discipline, as 
hinted by Gavin et al. (1997). Therefore, we would expect to find a negative 
relation between the fiscal balances and the financing costs. Note that this is a 
Fixed 
exchange 
rate regime
Fiscal 
discipline 
Conventional view
(fiscal dominance)
Financial cost & 
burden 
Cyclical 
position 
2st stage 1st stage 
Offsetting 
channels
Empirical 
approach
13
quite strong hypothesis. Indeed, if causality is admitted to run in the opposite 
direction –from the fiscal balance to the borrowing cost it should be expected a 
positive correlation between these variables. 
It is important to note that both expected effects may be closely intertwined. 
Lower borrowing costs are expected to be expansionary and, viceversa, economic 
expansions may have an impact on borrowing costs. In a traditional IS-LM framework 
the impact would be positive, but in emerging markets confidence considerations (high 
growth reinforcing economic confidence) might play a dominant role. This 
interconnection is also addressed in the empirical analysis. 
The second stage tests the link between the exchange rate regime and the 
determinants of fiscal discipline. The propositions to test are: 
I) Fixed exchange rates increase the level of activity, due to the anchoring of 
expectations, the reduction of real rates and large capital inflows, which 
generate an expansionary cycle. 
II) Fixed exchange rate regimes reduce the cost and burden of borrowing for the 
government, due to different factors, such as the disinflationary impact or the 
credibility of the regime, decreasing the risk premium. 
Note that most of these factors are expected to operate primarily at the inception 
of the exchange rate. The time dimension, underlying the boom and bust literature 
mentioned in the introduction, is hence bound to play a central role in our analysis. 
4.  DATA AND ECONOMETRIC CONSIDERATIONS 
Before starting the analysis it is important to make several considerations 
regarding the database and the variables and the econometric techniques used. 
The first regards to the choice of the sample, which is explained in more detail in 
annex 1. We take observations of 32 emerging market economies and transition 
countries, of which 18 belong to Latin America, 11 are European states in transition, 
plus Israel, Russia and Turkey. The sample for Latin American countries, Turkey and 
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Israel runs from 1972 to 2001, and for the European countries it starts, in the majority of 
cases, in 1990. From this wide sample we have excluded the observations 
corresponding to inflation and seignoriage outliers, leaving a base sample of 598 
observations. However, we use both samples, the one with the outliers and the one 
without them, to test for the robustness of the hypothesis. 
The definition of the variables is as follows: 
o Fixed regimes identification is explained with more detail in the annex. 
The approach adopted is somewhat different from the IMF’s, whose strict 
definition of fixed exchange rate regimes leaves out important 
stabilization efforts through semi-fixed arrangements, such as crawling 
pegs. Therefore, an alternative classification is produced, in which by 
examining more closely the nature of the exchange rate regimes, we 
expand the proportion of fixed exchange regimes from 49% (which we 
obtained from IMF’s strict definition) to 60%4. In doing the estimation 
regimes are defined by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for 
fixed regimes and 0 for the flexible cases. When there is a shift in regime, 
we assign a value of 1 for the year in which the change takes place if it is 
implemented in the first six months, and a value of 1 for the next year if it 
is implemented from July onwards. 
o The choice of the variable which gauges fiscal discipline raises difficult 
questions. Clearly, fiscal statistics in emerging markets are typically 
fuzzy, with items off-balance and ‘skeletons’5.  Even more relevant is the 
variable to define fiscal discipline. For the reasons put forward above we 
would in principle, prefer the shadow balance, that is, the primary balance 
                                               
4 Recently Levi-Leyati and Sturzenegger (2002) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) have 
proposed alternative definitions. We plan to check our results with their database, but they 
roughly correspond to ours. Nevertheless, the results presented in the paper are robust to a 
change in the definition of the exchange rate regime (using IMF’s one yield very similar 
outcomes). 
5 Gavin and Perotti (1997) overcome this problem with a revised database, but we keep on 
national accounts. 
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net of estimated seignoriage revenues, which are measured, following the 
traditional definition by Fischer (1982) as the increase in the monetary 
base relative to nominal GDP. However, this way of computing the 
shadow balance has some caveats: not only, as observed above, primary 
balance is to some extent endogenous to the ability to raise seignoriage, 
but also the definition of monetary seignoriage is an approximation which 
may not precisely apprehend the actual monetary financing of deficit. For 
this reasons, it is convenient to present the results for both the shadow 
and primary balance. This also facilitates comparison with previous 
contributions since their results have always been presented in terms of 
primary balances6. We also use the components of the fiscal balance, 
revenues and primary expenditures, to gain further insight on the 
behavior of the public sector accounts. 
o The effect of the cycle is conveyed by the change in output gap relative 
to GDP. The trend GDP is filtered out through and H-P decomposition. 
The alternative of using growth rate of GDP and introducing individual 
effects in the regressions yields very similar results, but given the 
different marked phases of growth in the region the output gap changes 
probably captures better the cyclical position. 
o Finally, we use two different variables to account for the cost and burden 
of borrowing which act as proxies of the financing constraints: interest 
payments of the public debt and the implicit interest rate on this total debt. 
Higher interest payments –determined by the yield paid and the debt to 
finance are expected to be associated with tighter financial constraints, 
either because rates will tend to increase when financing condition 
harden or because higher levels of indebtedness make financing 
increasingly difficult, or both. A second option is to dispense with the level 
of indebtedness and to use the implicit rate on total public debt, 
                                               
6 Overall fiscal balances have also been typically used, but to avoid excessive complexity in the 
table we do not present the results for this variable. 
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calculated as total interest payments divided by total public debt, that is, 
as the average interest rate on outstanding public debt7.
All the variables, but the regime dummies, are expressed in terms of GDP. The 
final set of considerations is of econometric nature. 
First, the database suggests the use of panel techniques in the analysis. In panel 
data estimation, individual effects are customarily included, but we consider that in some 
of our regressions this is inadequate. In particular, when regressing the variables 
against the regime dummies the results on the regression would be distorted; since 
introducing individual effects implies to subtract the cross-country averages from the 
variables in the regression, this would imply that what is regressed is the (cross-country) 
deviation of the dependent variable on the (deviation of) the regime dummy, therefore 
distorting the relevant relation to explore which is the level of deficit on the exchange 
rate regime8. In the rest of the cases we include individual effects. 
Second, the series show important inertia and the issue of unit roots may 
become a concern. Therefore, in the regressions on the exchange rates dummies the 
lagged value of the dependent variable has been included. When we implement the 
instrumental variables technique, we address this problem using first order 
autoregressive correction for the residuals. 
Third, heteroskedasticity, which leads to an important loss of efficiency in 
estimation, although the estimates are still unbiased and consistent, is another problem 
which may arise in the data. Since we are interested in the significance of the 
parameters rather than in their value, it is important to correct the estimations for 
heteroskedasticity. This is done by controlling for cross-country variances. Related to 
this, the wide volatility advises to make use of weighted least square (WLS) estimation 
                                               
7 The increase in public debt, which appear in the budget constraint of section two is an 
inappropriate proxy because it may signal itself fiscal indiscipline. 
8 Note also that, if individual effects were considered, there would be no difference between 
countries with only one type of regime in the whole sample, since the resulting dummy value 
(which would be defined as deviation from the mean value of the regime) would be in both cases 
equal to zero. 
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which place proportionally lower weight to more extreme observations. Even so, in a 
sample with several episodes of hyperinflations and depressions, outliers are large. As 
we note before, the sample used in estimation filters out the upper ten per cent of the 
inflation series, although we also have used the whole sample to test for the robustness 
of our hypothesis. 
Finally, the issue of endogeneity and inverse causality is tackled. In the hypothesis 
presented underlies a causality from left to right in the chart (from the exchange rate 
regime to the cycle and financing constraint and from these to fiscal discipline). But it 
could be argued, for instance, that exchange rate regimes and fiscal discipline or 
borrowing costs are endogenous, that is, that they are determined at the same time, and 
consequently it is impossible to establish a clear relationship between them; or that the 
evolution of borrowing costs is a consequence of fiscal discipline, and not vice versa as 
we suggest. Several venues are used in the equations relating the economics variables, 
but not  on those including the exchange rate regime, since we do not think endogeneity 
is an issue in that case9. In particular, to solve the endogeneity issue we instrument the 
variables by the lagged value of the regressor and, in some cases, by an ‘external’ 
instrument (the current account balance as a percentage of GDP). Then we perform 
some Granger type causality tests. Also, the sign of the relationship may help to reveal 
the direction of causality. The focus on the temporal effects of exchange rates in the last 
section helps to address these problems, too. 
                                               
9 The potential issue of endogeneity in the context of the paper raises would raise when the 
choice of a rigid regime is unfeasible due to a negative fiscal o financial situation, or viceversa, 
that pegs are only feasible when fiscal situation is right.. But note, on the one hand that the 
choice of  the sample in the work is done taking into account the more or less explicit attempt of 
using the exchange rate peg as stabilizing device, that is, the expected causation is from left to 
right. On the other hand, if there remained some cases of  regimes determined by the fiscal 
situation, this would imply that worse fiscal results are expected when the regime is flexible, 
which is precisely the hypothesis we test and, as we will see, reject, strengthening our results. 
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5.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Fixed exchange rates and fiscal discipline. The direct channel 
Figure 1 in the introduction showed graphically that fixed regimes reduce inflation 
but they fail to improve fiscal discipline. Table 1 formally confirms the muted effect of 
fixed exchange rate regimes on fiscal discipline. First, we confirm that seignoriage 
revenues are reduced under fixed regimes10. However, when the two measures of 
discipline are regressed against the regime, the parameter of the dummy is not 
significant, and it even takes a negative value for the primary balance. Neither is a 
significant effect found on the components of the primary balance: revenues and primary 
expenditures11. All in all, fixing the exchange rate does NOT induce discipline on fiscal 
policy. 
First stage: factors determining fiscal discipline 
The levers of fiscal discipline under our hypothesis are the cyclical position and 
the financing constraint. As mentioned above, both factors may be intertwined, so 
Table 2 displays the joint impact of the cycle, measured as changes in the output gap, 
and our proxies for the external constraint on fiscal discipline. We combine the cyclical 
position with both interest payments and the implicit interest rate, so that there are two 
different regressions, one for each of the fiscal discipline variables. Furthermore, for 
each regression the results, using both OLS and instrumental variables are displayed. 
The instruments used are the lagged regressors and the current account balance, and 
the results are very similar in both specifications. 
As shown in the table 2.a, we do not find any relation between the cyclical 
position of the economy and the primary balance. This is so because the cycle tends to 
increment fiscal revenues but also, primary expenditures (table 2.b). It seems that 
                                               
10 For the sake of completeness, we have also regressed the fiscal discipline variables on 
seignoriage. Only the shadow balance is largely significant, but this is expected since the shadow 
balances is constructed using seignoriage revenues. 
11 When maintaining the full sample (with outliers) the impact on revenues is found to be 
negative and significant. The large reduction in inflation that countries experiences when fixing 
the exchange rate could lie behind this result. 
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governments tend to make use the additional revenue they attain when activity grows to 
increase public expenditure. However, there is a positive and significant relationship 
between the cycle and the shadow balance, as an increase in activity leads to less 
seignorage revenues in terms of GDP. 
The results for the financing constraint are robust for both the primary and 
shadow balance: a tighter financing constraint (increase in interest payments or the 
implicit interest rate) brings about an improvement in the fiscal position. The correction 
in the fiscal balance is engineered by an increase in revenues and a decrease in 
expenditures (although for the interest rate the impact on expenditures is 
non-significant)12.
In doing these regressions we have to deal with the issue of endogeneity. We 
tried to address this issue using instrumental variables technique, but we have too some 
indication that the casuality runs from left to right in the table (from the interest payments 
to the fiscal variables), which the sign of the coefficient: if the causality were from fiscal 
discipline to the financing constraint the expected signs would be the opposite (negative, 
that is, higher discipline leads to a reduction in the financing constraint). 
 Finally, it is interesting to explore the link between the cycle and the financing 
constraint, which is displayed in table 3. For the case of the implicit rate the results are 
non significant, but we find a strong significant negative relation between the cyclical 
position and interest payments (although not with the implicit interest rate)13. As 
mentioned above, in principle the direction of causality is unclear, and rather it could be 
thought of a simultaneous occurrence between both facts. To shed a bit more of light on 
the issue we have perform a Granger causality test, in both directions: the output gap is 
shown to Granger-cause the interest payments, while the opposite direction of causality 
is rejected by the test. 
                                               
12 When doing these regressions with the whole sample we loose the significance, but not the 
sign and the relative value of coefficients.
13 Note that the variable interest payments is defined as a ratio to nominal GDP, while in  the 
implicit rate variable no trace of GDP is found. This difference might explain to some extent the 
difference of results, but also note that the GDP is defined in levels and nominal terms. 
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Second stage: exchange rate regimes and the fiscal constraints 
Table 4 summarizes how the exchange rate affects the cycle and the costs of 
borrowing. Recall that the regime is captured by a dummy which takes value of one 
when the country has a fixed exchange rate. We find a significant negative effect on 
interest payments and interest rate on debt, but apparently there is no significant 
correlation between the fixed regime and the cyclical position. Therefore, fixing the 
exchange rate contributes to relax the financing constraint but it does not generate by 
itself an expansionary cycle. 
Wrap-up of the results 
Our hypothesis sustained that the favorable impact of fixing the exchange rates 
on fiscal discipline through the reduction of seignoriage revenues is offset by the 
relaxation of the financing constraint and an expansion of activity, which favors an 
increase in revenues. 
Considering together the evidence found so far the reduction of borrowing costs 
engineered by the peg plays a significant role in determining fiscal discipline: when a 
country fixes the exchange rate, it enjoys a softer financial constraint, and a softer 
financial constraint leads to a relaxation of fiscal discipline. Therefore, the first building 
block of our hypothesis finds strong empirical support. 
However, the results are weaker on the cycle channel. We find that expansions 
tend to have no effect on the primary balance This lack of effect is explained as we find 
an increase in revenues and in primary expenditures when activity gains momentum. 
On the contrary the effect is positive on the shadow balance due to the observed 
reduction in seignorage revenues as a percentage of GDP. Therefore, the direct 
evidence of the impact of the cycle on fiscal discipline is at best mixed. Notwithstanding 
this, an indirect impact of the cyclical position is hinted by its effects on the financing 
constraints, as we find a strong link between the cycle and interest payments and the 
causality running from the cycle to the financing constraint. So in economic expansions, 
financing constraint relaxes and through this indirect way, the cycle would has an effect 
in relaxing fiscal discipline. 
21
But even if this interpretation was valid, fixed regimes have not been found to 
have a significant impact on the cycle, and this would undermine our proposition. This 
lack of significance maybe is due to the well known macroeconomic dynamics 
generated after the fixing of the exchange rates. Indeed, it is insightful to develop this 
point in detail. 
6.  THE DYNAMICS OF THE EXCHANGE RATE PEGS 
In this section we focus on the induced dynamics on the relevant economic 
variables of pegging the exchange rate. There exists a rich literature on the economic 
implications of exchange rate stabilizations. Exchange-rate-based stabilization schemes 
(hereafter, ERBS) usually bring about rapid disinflation (due to the anchoring of external 
prices) and an economic expansion. 
From a theoretical perspective, this initial expansion can be explained by 
inflationary inertia in the service sectors, which, in the aggregate, push down real 
interest rates [Rodríguez (1982)]; or by the imperfect credibility of the new regime which 
favors present relative to future consumption, inducing a consumption boom in the initial 
stages of the peg [Vegh (1992)]. Moreover, as our results (table 4) show, fixing the 
exchange rate reduce the borrowing costs, reinforcing these effects. Typically, the 
expansion is coupled with a growing current account deficit and the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. In the medium run, demand exhausts its expansionary impulse and 
leads to recession and, most of times, to the collapse of the fixed regime. This is a brief 
account of the characteristic “boom-bust cycle” of ERBS. Econometric evidence on all 
this aspects is quite robust [Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) and references in Calvo and 
Vegh (1998)]. 
This sort of dynamics is central to our hypothesis. Since fixing the exchange rate 
is the trigger for an expansion which is followed by a slowing down of activity or a 
recession before the regime is abandoned it is to be expected that the overall effect 
(which conveys the whole boom and bust cycle) is not significant, as we found in our 
econometric exercise (table 4).
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So it is convenient to explore in detail the behavior of the relevant variables 
around the peg. The graphical analysis in figure 2, whose charts display the mean and 
one standard deviation of these variables before and after the fixing (denoting by t the 
year of fixing) is an appropriate starting point, but the high volatility of the series makes 
hard to draw robust conclusions from this visual inspection, so it is useful to 
complement it with a more formal analysis. 
Using the previous panel, after filtering out the previous sample14, we now base 
the econometric analysis on two different approaches comparing the periods before and 
after the peg: a cumulative time dummy analysis and an equal coefficient test. The 
results for selected variables are shown in table 5. The first approach applies time 
dummies which take a value of 1 in the year in which the peg is adopted (t), the year 
after (t+1) and so on. By sequentially accumulating these dummies and using them as 
regressors, we can check the effects of the regime shift on the relevant variables. The 
shaded areas in the graph display the range of periods from the inception of the peg in 
which the cumulated peg dummy is significant. The second approach defines two 
dummys representing two periods of time (‘before’ and ‘after’ the peg, being ‘after’ 
year t, t+1 and so on), and test for the equalization of the coefficients of these dummys. 
If we find equal coefficients, we can conclude that the behavior of the variable before 
and after the new exchange rate policy is the same. 
The results are as follows: 
The disinflationary impact of the peg is evident from the graph (chart a) and it is 
confirmed by the econometric analysis. For the monetary seignoriage (chart b) visual 
inspection would suggest a clear reduction, and the parameter associated to the fixed 
regime is significantly lower. However, the cumulative dummy is only lower for the two 
first periods (table 5.a). 
                                               
14 The sample is reduced relative to that of previous sections. Specifically, we have eliminated 
fixed regimes that last more than five years, those countries with no change in their regime in the 
whole sample, and some observations corresponding to fixed regimes derived from Bretton 
Woods arrangements. So the results are not fully comparable to those of section 3. 
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On the primary balance (chart c) the impact seems to be positive, up to the third 
year, with cumulated improvements of one and a half of GDP. Beyond that point the 
improvements reverse and the variable returns to levels previous to the fixing. The 
econometric tests (table 5.b) only display a marginally significant value for the 
cumulative dummy between periods t and t+3. The results are more robust for the 
shadow balance. Now the cumulative increase is around 2% of GDP; although the 
improvements subsequently reverse, and despite the results for seignoriage just 
described, the peg turns to improve significantly the shadow balance one year after the 
peg and for all the following periods, according to the two econometric tests. 
Revenues (chart e) dramatically and continuously increase, around 7 percentage 
points of GDP at t+5, but primary expenditures (chart f) also increase in parallel. In no 
case, there is an statistically significant change in the behaviour of the parameters, 
however (not shown). 
The ‘boom’ phase in the cycle is observable in chart g, lasting until the fourth 
year after the peg (t+3 in the chart)15. After that, there is a return to previous levels 
afterwards, coinciding with the bust phase of the cycle. The two econometric tests 
(table 5.c) show a significant increase due to the peg after the third and until the fifth 
year of the peg. 
Finally, the impact on borrowing costs (chart h and chart i) strongly supports the 
softening of the borrowing constraint, since they are consistently and permanently lower 
under fixed regimes: interest payments shrink around 1,6 percentage points of GDP, 
and it is particularly relevant the big reduction in the implicit interest rate (7 percentage 
points). The econometric test supports these results (table 5.d). 
To sum up, in the charts it is observed that the improvement on the fiscal 
accounts exists but tend to be transitory. On the one hand, revenues substantially 
increase  in terms of  GDP and  then tend to stabilize, but expenditure increases display  
                                               
15 The chart with raw growth figures  (not shown) illustrate a much more drastic change. The 
point here is that even using a more refine definition of cyclical growth the boom-bust hypothesis 
holds. 
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higher inertia. The improvement in fiscal accounts is probably related to the expansion 
of activity after the peg and to the reduction of the fiscal burden. When the boom 
dissipates, revenues and the burden of debt stabilize but expenditures keep on 
growing, and this is reflected in the worsening of the primary balance. Therefore, fixing 
the exchange rate trigger dynamics which have perverse effects on fiscal discipline: the 
deterioration of the fiscal stance at the end of expansion may even be an important 
explanatory factor behind the final abandonment of the peg, as Kaminsky et al. (1996) 
show, in their work on exchange rate crises. 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has attempted to present and test a comprehensive rationale for the 
failure of exchange rates to provide fiscal discipline, a result which is statistically robust 
in our database of emerging countries. Our hypothesis states that fixing the exchange 
rate has a negative impact on fiscal discipline through the relaxation of the fiscal 
constraint of the government. This effect offsets the beneficial impact on discipline that 
fixed exchange rates should have through the reduction in inflationary financing. In 
particular fixing the exchange rate reduces the cost and burden of debt and enhances 
the ability to obtain revenues through a higher level of activity. 
The empirical test of these hypothesis has followed a two-stage approach in a 
panel analysis. The hypothesised channel from exchange rate pegs to lower cost of 
financing and relaxing of discipline has found a strong empirical support. On the 
contrary, the second channel, through cyclical expansion and relaxing of discipline is 
less robust: fixed regimes are not shown to have significant impact on the cycle and the 
link between economic expansion and fiscal disciplined has revealed blurred. 
 In order to overcome this problem with the second channel we have explored the 
evolving dynamics that a peg engineers on the relevant variables and in particular on 
the cyclical position, an issue on which the literature has focused. The results from this 
analysis is clarifying and strengthens our hypothesis, since it is shown that at its 
inception the peg generates an economic expansion, and also softens the financing 
constraint. The ensuing deterioration of the economic indicators reveals how the peg 
throws the seeds of its own destruction. 
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ANNEX 1: DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGIES 
This annex presents an overview of the data we have used in the empirical tests. 
We have selected 32 emerging markets economies and transition countries, of 
which 18 are from Latin America, other 11 are European transition countries, and the 
last three are Israel, Russia and Turkey16. The selection is made on the basis that for all 
these countries the choice of exchange rate regime has played and continues to play a 
central position in monetary policy strategies17.
The bulk of the data are taken from the IMF’s ‘International Financial Statistics’. 
They include the official exchange rate, in units of local currency per US dollar (line ae), 
consumer prices (line 64), reserve money (line 14), the government deficit or surplus 
(line 80), nominal and real GDP (lines 99), public debt (lines 88 and 89) and the current 
account balance (line 78ald). Data for interest payments on public debt from the IMF’s 
‘Government Finance Statistics’ and from World Bank database are used to construct 
series of primary deficit. Where it is possible, we have complemented these statistics 
with national data. In general, we have data from 1972 to 2001 for Latin American 
countries, Israel and Turkey, and from 1990 to 2001 for European transition countries 
and Russia. 
We define ‘seignorage’ as the annual change in reserve money scaled by 
nominal GDP, as in Fischer (1982). It is immediate to see that these calculations are 
equivalent  to  the  definitions  appearing  in  the text.  To compute ‘shadow balance’ we 
                                               
16 Selected countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Nicaragua, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Croatia, and Israel, Russia and 
Turkey. 
17 Therefore, we have not not included any Asian countries in the sample. It could be argued 
that we could have incurred in a sample selection bias, but we think that the almost similar 
economic structure of Latin America and European countries (high presence of the public sector 
in the economy, high and inefficient bureaucracy, import substitution strategy to develop, etc) and 
the necessity of stabilizing the economy both type of countries have, in contrast with Asian 
nations, made the sample homogeneous and help us to avoid the bias. Moreover, we have 
performed the same sort of analysis using only Latin America countries, and the results, except 
for the primary expenditure, are very similar to those presented in the paper.
28
simply subtract monetary seignorage from primary balance. Consumer price indices are 
used to calculate the rate of inflation, and the cyclical position is computed as changes 
in the output gap –relative to GDP, derived from original real GDP series using a 
Hodrick-Prescott type filter. The lambda used was 100. 
We have constructed a separate sample without inflation outliers since they may 
distort the results. Inflation outliers are defined as those in the last decile of the sample, 
leaving observations whose inflation rate is less than 120% a year. This leaves a 
maximum of 598 observations although for some variables, most notably primary 
deficits, the availability of data is lower. 
A more contentious issue we had to deal with was the definition of the exchange 
rate regimes. Our main source of information had to be, in principle, IMF’s ‘Exchange 
Rate Arrangements And Exchange Restrictions: Annual Report’, in which the IMF 
classified exchange rate arrangements as “Pegged”, “Limited flexibility”, and “More 
flexible arrangements”. So first of all we construct an ‘IMF sample’ taking fixed 
exchange rate regimes as those labeled as “Pegged” according to IMF. 
But this definition poses many problems, as it does not include some Exchange 
Rate Based Stabilizations (ERBS) instrumented via not strictly fixed exchange rates, 
like crawling pegs or crawling bands, which are labeled as “More flexible arrangements” 
by the IMF18. The IMF itself recognizes this problem in a recent publication 
[IMF (1999)], and reclassifies many countries’ arrangements from year to year. Finally, 
in 1999 issue of ‘Exchange Rate Arrangements…’, and in subsequent publications, IMF 
labels the exchange rate regimes not as fixed or flexible like previously, but as currency 
boards, crawling pegs, target bands, etc., letting the reader to decide which is a pegged 
exchange rate an which is not. One of the best examples of the possible inadequacy 
                                               
18 Two recent papers, those by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) and by Levy-Yeati and 
Sturzenegger (2002) also changes IMF’s strict definition. Reinhart and Rogoff distinguish 
between a “standard” definition of an exchange rate regime, based on IMF’s classification, and a 
“natural” definition, based on the performance of the official exchange rate, declarations from the 
Government, the behavior of the Central Bank, and so on. More or less, our modified sample 
coincides with the “natural” classification of Reinhart and Rogoff. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
take five types of exchange rate arrangements, from floating to currency boards, not making any 
distinction between flexible and fixed regimes. 
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of IMF’s previous definition is the Brazilian Plano Real, a “genuine” ERBS dated in 
July 1994 which was instrumented within a crawling peg system from 1995 to 
January 1999, and which was labeled as “managed floating” by the IMF. 
Having this in mind, we have filtered the IMF sample and constructed an 
alternative to be used instead of the former. We have added some episodes of 
semi-fixed exchange rate arrangements that countries implemented with a clear 
stabilization objective19. Finally, when a country changes its system we have changed 
its definition if the change occurs in the last six months of the year. 
In Table A.1 we show the differences between IMF stricter sample and our 
sample:
Table A.1 Differences between samples 
Country Date IMF sample Modified sample 
Argentina 1979-1980 Flexible Fixed (Tablita)
Argentina 1985-1986 Flexible Fixed (Plan Austral)
Bolivia 1997-1998 Flexible Fixed 
Brazil 1986 Flexible Fixed (Cruzado)
Brazil 1994-1998 Flexible Fixed (Plano Real)
Chile 1978 Flexible Fixed 
Chile 1985-1999 Flexible Fixed 
Colombia 1992-1999 Flexible Fixed 
Ecuador 1995-1999 Flexible Fixed 
                                               
19 This is the reason why we consider Brazil’1994 as a ERBS, although it was a crawling peg 
system, and a Money Based Stabilization Bolivia’1986, a country which currency has been 
depreciating against the US dollar at a much slower pace than the Brazilian’s one. However, in 
IMF (1999) Bolivia is considered again as a fixed exchange rate, as “the deviations of the market 
exchange rate from the official exchange rate (…) are extremely tight (…), and that the regime is 
in practice a crawling peg aimed at maintaining the competitiveness of the economy”. Finally, in 
most recent issues of IMF’s International Financial Statistics some countries are marked with an 
asterisk, denoting that “this country has a de facto regime which differs from its de iure regime”. 
These considerations show that the definition of the regime is not a easy issue. To define theses 
episodes we have consulted, among others, Kiguel & Liviatan (1992), Tornell & Velasco (1998), 
Hamann (1999) and IMF (1999). 
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Honduras 1997-2001 Flexible Fixed 
México 1988-1994 Flexible Fixed 
Uruguay 1978-1982 Flexible Fixed (Tablita)
Uruguay 1992-2001 Flexible Fixed 
Venezuela 1996-2001 Flexible Fixed 
Hungary 1995-2001 Flexible Fixed 
Latvia 1994-1996 Flexible Fixed 
Poland 1991-1999 Flexible Fixed 
Source: IMF (1999) and own elaboration. 
Finally, in table A.2. we show the median of the main variables for the different 
exchange regimes, once we have filtered IMF’s definition:
Table A.2 Main features of the samples: median 
Without outliers Whole sample 
FLEXIBLE REGIMES (observations) (225) (276) 
     Overall balance -1,76 -2,22 
     Primary balance 
     Revenues 
     Primary expenditures 
     Total expenditures 
0,33
16,02 
15,19 
18,28 
0,24
16,37 
15,67 
19,58 
     Inflation 19,75 26,48 
     Monetary seignorage 2,04 2,41 
     Real GDP growth 3,58 3,38 
     Interest payments 
     Implicit interest rate 
     Public external debt service 
     Output gap change 
     Shadow primary balance 
1,85
6,38
4,27
0,19
-1,77 
1,99
6,28
4,19
0,03
-2,23 
FIXED REGIMES (observations) (365) (420) 
     Overall balance -2,10 -2,12 
     Primary balance 
     Revenues 
     Primary expenditures 
     Total expenditures 
0,03
17,55 
18,43 
20,71 
-0,05 
17,55 
18,18 
20,56 
     Inflation 13,05 13,42 
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     Monetary seignorage 1,58 1,71 
     Real GDP growth 4,32 4,20 
     Interest payments 
     Implicit interest rate 
     Public external debt service 
     Output gap change 
     Shadow primary balance 
1,56
5,17
3,31
0,93
-2,05 
1,49
5,16
3,11
0,90
-2,06 
Source: own calculations. 
As for the econometric technique, we have used panel data analysis with fixed 
effects when required (table 2 and table 3). We made the estimations via weighted least 
squares (WLS) and the heteroskedasticity is corrected with cross sectional variance. 
We present the results for the regressions using WLS with a lag of the 
dependent variable, to take account of persistence in the data (this is equivalent to take 
a first order autorregresive correction for the residuals). 
We also use instrumental variables (IV) to avoid endogeneity problems. The 
instruments used are first and, in some cases, second lag of the regressor (output gap, 
implicit interest rate), and lags of the regressor and the current account balance (interest 
payments). When necessary, estimations are corrected for the presence of first order 
autocorrelation in the residuals. 
Finally, we have filtered the sample eliminating observations of high inflation, 
specifically the upper ten percent of the inflation series (change in consumer prices 
higher than 120% a year). The line ‘outliers’ in the tables shows changes in the 
significance of the coefficients when the wider sample is used. 
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ANNEX 2: FIGURES AND TABLES CITED IN THE PAPER: 
FIGURE 1: EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE (a)
Source: own calculations.
(a) Medians of each variable.
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Table 1. Exchange rate regime and fiscal variables (a)
Seignorage Primary balance Shadow balance Accrued revenues Primary expenditures
Fixed regime -0,54 (***) -0,19 0,13 -0,21 -0,03
     (t-value) (-3,93) (-1,20) (0,57) (-1,46) (-0,20)
Outliers {(**)
(a) Estimation via WLS, including first lag of dependent variable in each case.
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
{in line "outliers" denotes that the estimation usig the whole sample (including outliers) changes the result
       with the restricted sample to significant
xin line "outliers" denotes that the result shown changes to non significant estimating the relationship
       with the whole sample (with outliers)
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Table 2.a. Combined effects on fiscal variables of cyclical position and financial variables
Primary balance Shadow balance
WLS (a) IV (b) WLS (a) IV (b) WLS (a) IV (b) WLS (a) IV (b)
Cyclical position 0,02 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,14 (***) 0,19 (***) 0,14 (***) 0,14 (***)
     (t-value) (0,83) (0,67) (0,11) (0,99) (4,05) (4,07) (3,90) (2,60)
     Outliers {(*) x
Interest payments 0,27 (***) 0,27 (***) --- --- 0,27 (***) 0,46 (***) --- ---
     (t-value) (5,87) (3,31) --- --- (4,02) (3,80) --- ---
     Outliers
Implicit interest rate --- --- 0,12 (***) 0,12 (**) --- --- 0,13 (***) 0,13 (*)
     (t-value) --- --- (4,54) (2,12) --- --- (3,43) (1,78)
    Outliers x x
(a) Estimation via WLS, including first lag of dependent variable in each case
(b) Estimation via 2SLS, using first lag of each regressor and the current account balance as instruments.
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectivley.
{in line "outliers" denotes that the estimation usig the whole sample changes the result to significant
xin line "outliers" denotes that the result shown changes to non significant estimating the relationship with the whole sample
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Table 2.b. Combined effects on fiscal variables of cyclical position and financial variables
Accrued revenues Primary expenditure
WLS (a) IV (b) WLS (a) IV (b) WLS (a) IV (b) WLS (a) IV (b)
Cyclical position 0,06 (***) 0,18 (***) 0,04 (**) 0,18 (**) 0,07 (***) 0,23 (***) 0,07 (**) 0,29 (***)
     (t-value) (2,93) (2,94) (2,02) (2,43) (2,64) (3,35) (2,49) (3,43)
     Outliers x x x x x x x
Interest payments 0,11 (***) 0,21 (*) --- --- -0,12 (**) -0,22 (**) --- ---
     (t-value) (2,68) (1,92) --- --- (-2,32) (-1,99) --- ---
     Outliers
Implicit interest rate --- --- 0,06 (***) 0,14 (*) --- --- -0,06 (*) -0,01
     (t-value) --- --- (2,62) (1,79) --- --- (-1,93) (-0,11)
    Outliers x x
(a) Estimation via WLS, including first lag of dependent variable in each case
(b) Estimation via 2SLS, using first lag of each regressor and the current account balance as instruments.
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectivley.
{in line "outliers" denotes that the estimation usig the whole sample changes the result to significant
xin line "outliers" denotes that the result shown changes to non significant estimating the relationship with the whole sample
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Table 3. Cyclical position and financial variables
a. Coefficients and significance:
Interest payments Implicit interest rate
WLS (a) IV (b) WLS (a) IV (b)
Cyclical position -0,03 (***) -0,46 (**) 0,03 0,27
     (t-value) (-3,61) (-2,17) (1,62) (0,75)
     Outliers
(a) Estimation via WLS, including first lag of dependent variable in each case.
(b) Estimation via 2SLS, using first lag of cyclical position as instrument.
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectivley.
b. Granger casualty test (c):
Null Hypothesis Rejected F-Statistic Probability
Output gap does not
Granger Cause interest payments
Null Hypothesis Rejected F-Statistic Probability
Interest payments does not
Granger Cause output gap
(c) Test using four lags.
Yes 5,34 0,00
No 0,72 0,58
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Table 4. Exchange rate regime and factors of discipline (a)
Interest payments Implicit interest rate Cyclical position
Fixed regime -0,12 (**) -0,46 (***) 0,37
     (t-value) (-2,41) (-2,66) (1,38)
Outliers
(a) Estimation via WLS, including first lag of dependent variable in each case.
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectivley.
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Table 5.a. Test of structural change (a)
Monetary seignorage
Accumulative (1) Equal parameters (2)
Before vs. t 0,21 Yes
t-value / significance level 0,55 0,330
Before vs. t to t+1 -0,40 (*) No
t-value / significance level -1,60 0,001
Before vs. t to t+2 -0,13 No
t-value / significance level -0,61 0,004
Before vs. t to t+3 -0,12 No
t-value / significance level -0,61 0,003
Before vs. t to t+4 -0,20 No
t-value / significance level -1,17 0,000
Before vs. t to t+5 -0,18 No
t-value / significance level -1,09 0,001
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Table 5.b Test of structural change (a)
Primary balance Shadow balance
Accumulative (1) Equal parameters (2) Accumulative (1) Equal parameters (2)
Before vs. t 0,25 Yes 0,39 Yes
t-value / significance level 0,58 0,933 0,61 0,343
Before vs. t to t+1 0,28 Yes 1,08 (**) No
t-value / significance level 1,02 0,942 2,58 0,011
Before vs. t to t+2 0,34 Yes 0,77 (**) No
t-value / significance level 1,50 0,954 2,19 0,032
Before vs. t to t+3 0,34 (*) Yes 0,80 (**) No
t-value / significance level 1,65 0,991 2,54 0,024
Before vs. t to t+4 0,17 Yes 0,74 (**) No
t-value / significance level 0,88 0,579 2,52 0,030
Before vs. t to t+5 0,09 Yes 0,56 (**) No
t-value / significance level 0,49 0,419 1,98 0,069
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Table 5.c. Test of structural change (a)
Cyclical position: real gdp growth Cyclical position: output gap change
Accumulative (1) Equal parameters (2) Accumulative (1) Equal parameters (2)
Before vs. t 0,58 Yes 0,70 Yes
t-value / significance level 0,73 0,245 1,00 0,212
Before vs. t to t+1 0,14 Yes 0,54 Yes
t-value / significance level 0,26 0,371 1,12 0,176
Before vs. t to t+2 0,29 Yes 0,74 (*) No
t-value / significance level 0,62 0,225 1,81 0,068
Before vs. t to t+3 0,53 No 0,84 (**) No
t-value / significance level 1,29 0,098 2,34 0,037
Before vs. t to t+4 0,21 Yes 0,61 (*) No
t-value / significance level 0,56 0,227 1,84 0,089
Before vs. t to t+5 0,14 Yes 0,52 Yes
t-value / significance level 0,38 0,271 1,64 0,122
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Table 5.d. Test of structural change (a)
Interest payments Implicit interest rate
Accumulative (1) Equal parameters (2) Accumulative (1) Equal parameters (2)
Before vs. t 0,18 Yes 0,21 Yes
t-value / significance level 1,28 0,754 0,53 0,340
Before vs. t to t+1 -0,12 No -0,10 No
t-value / significance level -1,31 0,003 -0,36 0,044
Before vs. t to t+2 -0,14 (*) No -0,02 No
t-value / significance level -1,78 0,001 -0,10 0,043
Before vs. t to t+3 -0,17 (**) No -0,18 No
t-value / significance level -2,46 0,000 -0,89 0,008
Before vs. t to t+4 -0,18 (**) No -0,17 No
t-value / significance level -2,86 0,000 -0,89 0,009
Before vs. t to t+5 -0,14 (**) No -0,12 No
t-value / significance level -2,36 0,000 -0,65 0,013
COMMON NOTE FOR TABLES 5.a TO 5.d:
(a) Estimation via WLS, including first lag of dependent variable in each case.
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectivley.
(1) Accumulative effect of fixing the exchange rate (time t=1) and maintain it two years (t+2), three years (t+3), and so on.
(2) Test of equal parameters in a regression of each variable on two dummys, one representing those years before fixing
the exchange rate, and the other the years after the peg. We show significance level (p-value) of the test, accepting the
hypothesis of equal coefficients when this p-value is higher than 0,10.
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FIGURE 2: EVOLUTION OF SOME VARIABLES AROUND THE PEG (a)
Chart a. Inflation rate Chart b. Monetary seignorage
Chart c. Primary balance Chart d. Shadow primary balance
Chart e. Public revenues Chart f. Public primary expenditures
Chart g. Real GDP growth Chart h. Output gap change
Chart i. Interest payments Chart j. Implicit interest rate on public debt
(a) Average value of the variables in the sample, plus and minus one standard deviation
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